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The Battle of Wilson's Creek
By EDWIN C, BEABSS
Regional research historian for tlie National Park Service at Vicks-
burg, Mississippi, Mr, Bearss prepared a detailed report on the Battle
of Wilson's Creek for the proposed restoration of the battlefield. He has
intensively studied and published several articles on the Civil War in
the West.
When Brigadier Ceneral Nathaniel Lyon returned to
Springfield, Missouri, on August 8, 1861, following his forced
reconnaissance to Curran Post Office, most of his Army of
the West encamped about the city. Lieutenant Colonel
Ceorge L, Andrews and Major Samuel D. Sturgis with about
2,000 regulars and volunteers were posted at Camp Hunter
on the Telegraph road four miles southwest of Springfield,
To guard against a surprise attack and prevent news of his
plans and strength from reaching the Confederates, Lyon
moved to seal off the city, A close watch was kept on all roads
leading into the town. Although the Union sentries permitted
anyone to enter the city, no one was allowed to go out except
physicians, who first had to present passes signed by the
military,-"^
Ceneral Lyon consulted freely with his ofiBcers and the
leading Union men, of Springfield following his return to the
city. The general clearly saw the developing strategic situa-
1 Return I, Holcombe and W, S, Adams, An Account of the Battle of
Wilson's Creek, or Oak Hills, Fought Between the Union Troops, Com-
manded by Gen. N. Lyon, and the Southern, or Confederate Troops,
Under Command of Gens. McCulloch and Price, on Saturday, August
10, 1861, in Greene County, Missouri (Springfield, 1883), 13, 17. Cen-
eral Lyon maintained his private quarters in a house on North Jefferson
Street owned by Mrs, Boren. His general headquarters were on the
north side of College Street, a Httle west of Main, in the house owned
by John S, Phelps, Ibid., 17-18,
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tion. His scouts kept him constantly informed of the Rebels'
movements. Lyon said that he was "impatient to fight" Briga-
dier Ceneral Benjamin McCulloch's command (A powerful
Confederate force commanded by McCulloch had followed
Lyon's army when it retired from Cinran Post Office ), but he
anxiously desired reinforcements to enable him to have a
reasonable chance of success. Every day he visited his out-
posts and sent off pleas for assistance. At times, Lyon would
lose his temper and curse and swear violently. Two prominent
Union men of Creene coimty recalled one incident when Lyon
received a dispatch from Major General John C. Fremont
(Fremont, who, as Lyon's superior, commanded the Western
Department, maintained his headquarters in St. Louis), stat-
ing that no more troops could or would be sent for the pres-
ent. As the general strode back and forth in his x'oom with the
paper in his hand, he suddenly threw it on the table and,
clapping his hands together, the general "cried out 'G-d
d-n General Fremont: He is a worse enemy to me and the
Union cause tlian Price and McCulloch and the whole d—d
tribe of rebels in this part of the State!' "^
On the afternoon of the 6th, Lyon learned from his spies
that the Confederate vanguard was encamped on Wilson
Creek, 12 miles southwest of Springfield. He accordingly de-
cided to make a night attack on this force with a portion of
Colonel Andi-ews' and Major Sturgis' brigades. Andrews and
Sturgis were alerted to have their men in ranks and the artil-
lery horses harnessed by 6 p.m. In the meantime, scouts were
sent out to reconnoiter the Confederate position.^
Shortly after Lyon had issued the marching orders to An-
drews and Sturgis, a report reached the general stating that a
Union patrol had clashed with a party of Major General
Sterling Price's Confederate cavalrj' ( Price, a former governor
of Missouri and a Mexican War hero, commanded the Mis-
souri State Guard) on the Grand Prairie, west of town. Rein-
forcements were immediately ordered to the support of the
patrol.
2 Ibid. 18-19.
3 The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of
the union and Confederate Armies (Washington, 1880-1900), Series
I, Vol. Ill, 59. The United States Geological Survey uses the form "Wil-
son Creek" on its maps.
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Evidently Lyon became so engrossed with preparations for
the attack on the Wilson Greek Gonfederates that he forgot
the time. When the general left his headquarters it was mid-
night, two hours after the scheduled hour. Nevertheless,
Lyon' proceeded to Gamp Hunter. When he reached An-
drews' and Sturgis' encampment, it was 3 a.m. It was too late
to get into position in time to attack the Gonfederates before
daybreak. The general returned to Springfield, taking An-
drews' and Sturgis' brigades with him.
On his retiirn to Springfield, Lyon told Major John M.
Schofield, his chief of staff, "that he had a premonition that
a night attack would prove disasti-ous, and yet he had felt
impelled to try it once, and perhaps should do so again, 'for
my only hope of success is in a surprise.' "*
Throughout the daylight hours on the 7th, strong Gonfed-
erate reconnaissance patirols operated on the southern and
western approaches to Springfield. The Union cavalry was in
frequent contact with these Rebels. An attack was expected
at any minute. Lyon kept his ti'oops under anns from day-
break to dark. At frequent intervals, farmers and members of
the Home Guard would come rushing into Springfield wiih
reports that the Gonfederates were coming. This served to
worry and exhaust tlie troops, thus depriving "them of the
rest which was absolutely necessary to fit them for battle
after their fatiguing march."
About noon, a report from some of his scouts reached Lyon
indicating that a strong force of Rebel infantry, supported
by two guns, was advancing on the Little York road. A force
of regulars and Kansas volunteers with two of Backoffs guns
was sent to engage this Gonfederate combat patrol. After ad-
vancing about four and one-half miles, the Federals discov-
ered that only a small Rebel mounted pafrol was operating on
the Little York road. These Southerners ffed at the North-
erners' approach. The disgusted Unionists reti-aced their steps.^
These reports of Gonfederate activity had a telling effect
on the civilians. Many of the inhabitants of Springfield be-
came panic-stricken, hurriedly packed their belongings, and
departed for supposed havens of safety; others made prepa-
* Ibid.; Holcombe and Adams, Battle of Wilson's Creek, 19-20.
B O. R., Series I, Vol. Ill, 59,
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rations to flee the threatened city. Toward nightfaU, the panic
began to wane. Nevertheless, many of the people who remain-
ed did not retire or make any effort to sleep. Golonel John S.
Phelps' Home Guard Regiment (commanded during the
colonel's absence by Golonel Marcus Boyd) was on the
"qui vive the whole night.""
Thursday morning (the 8th) Lyon again received reports
stating that the Rebels were advancing on Springfield. Lyon's
army was quickly moved into battle stations, while the bag-
gage wagons were concenti-ated in the center of the city. The
ti-oops were kept under arms most of the day. It was late in
the aftemoon before the Union officers learned that there
was not any truth to the mmors telUng of the foe's advance.'
During the aftemoon, Lyon convened a council of war. At
this meeting, summoned for the purpose of determining the
best way to extricate the army from its precarious position.
General Lyon announced to the officers:
Gentlemen, tliere is no prospect of our being re-en-
forced at tliis point; our supply of provisions is running
short; there is a superior force in front; and it is re-
ported that [Brigadier General William J.] Hardee is
marching with 9,000 men to cut our line of communica-
tion. It is evident that we must retreat. The question
arises, what is tlie best method of doing it. Shall we en-
deavor to retreat without giving the enemy battle before-
hand, and run the risk of having to fight every inch along
our line of retreat, or shall we attaek him in his position,
and endeavor to hurt him so that he cannot follow us.
I am decidedly in favor of the latter plan. I propose to
march this evening with all our available force, leaving
only a small guard to protect tlie property wliich wiU
be left behind, and marching by the . . . [Telegraph]
road, tlirow our whole force upon him at once, and en-
deavor to rout him before he can recover from his sur-
p
Lyon's principal officers dissuaded him from caiTying out
this operation. They told the general, "Many of the troops
were exhausted, and all were tired." In addition, a supply
train had arrived from Rolla. Gonsequently, Lyon decided it
8 Holcombe and Adams, Battle of Wilson's Creek, 21.
7 Ibid., 22.
8 O. R., Series I, Vol. Ill, 96.
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would be best "to clothe and shoe the men as far as^  practica-
ble, and to give them another day for recuperation."»
On the morning of the 9th, a courier reached Springfield
from St. Louis. The messenger earned a dispatch from Fre-
mont addressed to Lyon. Glancing at the letter, Lyon found
that Fremont did not consider his situation "critical." Fre-
mont beUeved that Lyon "doubtless over-estimated the force
in his front; that he ought not to fall back without good
cause." Lyon was informed that no reinforcements could be
sent, and "that he must report his future movements as soon
as possible, and do the best he could.''^"
With Fremont's communication before him, Lyon sat down
at the table in his headquarters and drafted the last letter
that he ever wTOte:
I have just received your note of the 6th instant by
special messenger,
I retired to this place, as I have before informed you,
reaching here on the 5th. The enemy followed to within
10 miles of here. He has taken a strong position, and is
recruiting his supplies of horses, mules, and provisions by
forages into the surrounding country, his large force of
mounted men enabling liim to do this witliout much an-
noyance from me. I find my position extiremely embarass-
ing, and am at present unable to detemiine whetlier I
shall be able to maintain my ground or be forced to re-
tire. I can resist any attack from the front, but if the
enemy move to surround me, I must retire. I shall hold
my ground as long as possible, though I may, without
knowing how far, endanger the safety of my entire force,
with its valuable material, being induced by the im-
portant considerations involved to take this step. The
enemy yesterday made a show of force about five miles
distant, and has doubtless a full purpose of making an
attack upon me.i^
After dispatching this note to Fremont, Lyon received word
that one of Gaptain David S. Stanley's companies of regulars
and Gompany I, 2d Kansas Infantry (Mounted) had clashed
with one of Price's mounted patrols on Grand Prairie, five
miles west of Springfield. The Gonfederates fied. From the
9 William M. ^Vhe^ry, "Wilson's Creek, and the Death of Lyon," Bat-
tles and Leaders of the Civil War, I, 289.
10 Holcombe and Adams, Battle of Wilson's Creek, 23.
á., 23-24; O. R., Series I, Vol. Ill, 52.
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captives it was learned that the Southerners were suffering
from a lack of provisions. To get supplies, they were com-
pelled "to do some pretty liberal foraging on both friends
and enemies,"-^ ^
This intelligence caused Lyon to send out a reconnaissance
patrol. Accordingly, the general asked Colonel Andrews to
send him a company of the 1st Missouri Infantry, In response
to the general's request. Company C ( Captain. C, Harry Stone
commanding) reported to Lyon's headquarters. Stone was
told to take his men and see if there were any Confederate
infantry closer to Springfield than Wilson Creek,
Stone's patrol moved out the Telegraph road about four
miles. Here Stone halted the infantry. The captain and sev-
eral mounted scouts advanced a mile closer to the Wilson
Creek encampment. Approaching a farm house, tlie Yankees
saw several Rebels making a hurried departure. At the house.
Captain Stone learned from the inhabitants that two of tlie
recent visitors were Texans, Having secured this information.
Stone's patrol retiimed to Springfield, and the captain re-
ported to Ceneral Lyon,^ ^
This constituted the first definite information that the
Union general had received that McCulloch and Price
had joined forces, Lyon decided he must act at once, before
the Confederates were able to consolidate tlieir position. The
general called another meeting of his brigade, regimental and
battery commanders.
When the council of war assembled, all the principal offi-
cers except Brigadier Ceneral Thomas W, Sweeny were pres-
ent, A number of the officers insisted that the Army of the
West was too small and poorly equipped to hazard a battle
with the powerful Confederate host. Furthermore, it was
pointed out that the superior Rebel cavalry would be able to
harass the army's rear, cut its communication lines, and cap-
ture the supply ti-ains, Fremont's message of the morning
was cited as evidence that "tliere was but scant prospect of
being reinforced before the impending battle," In addition,
there was every indication that the Southerners, in over-
12 James Peckham, Gen. Nathaniel Lyon and Missouri in 1861 (New
York, 1866), 325; Holcombe and Adams, BaUle of Wilson's Creek, 23,
13 Peckham, Lyon and Missouri, 325,
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whelming numbers, were about to descend on Springfield.
The officers reahzed that if there were to be a fight, it must
necessarily "be victory or annihilation.""
Lyon admitted that logic was on the side of the spokesmen
urging retreat. He, however, looked at the problem from a
different angle. The general reiterated his opinion that a
"stubborn contest would be a better guarantee" for the col-
umn's security in case of retreat. "A bold dash, skillfully made,
Lyon felt, "would astonish the foe and bewilder his judgment,
even though it might not succeed in routing him." Amid the
confusion of the Southerners in the wake of such a movement,
the general explained, the Union soldiers would be able to
retire in safety. A retreat which was conducted as proposed,
with a powerful foe pressing on the rear of the Army of the
West, might be the very means of its utter destruction, i»
The general also appreciated the great calamity that would
befall the people of Union prochvities residing in southwestern
Missouri if the Union army were to evacuate the area. Be-
sides, he observed, Springfield was tiie place to defend St.
Louis. In the event that the Federals were forced to fall back,
the hnes of retreat to Kansas City, Jefferson Git>% and Rolla
were still open. Finally, if Springfield were abandoned with-
out a batüe, "it might seriously damage the prestige of the
national arms."^*
Despite the logic behind Lyon's arguments, the council ot
war, after determining to fall back to Rolla, adjoumed. Orders
were issued to break camp preparatory to carrying out this
movement. •"^'^
By this time. General Sweeny and Gaptain Florence M.
Comyn (a surgeon in the 1st Missouri) had learned of the
decision to give up Springfield. In separate intei-views, these
two officers sought successfully to get the general to change
his mind. Speaking with the general on the back porch of the
Boren house. Sweeny pointed out:
. . . the disastrous results which must ensue upon a
1* Ibid., 326.
í^Ibid. Lyon theorized that if tlie rebels occupied southwestem Mis-
souri, they would enforce a mtUess conscription policy.
16 Ibid., 326-327.
" Ibid., 327.
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retreat without a battle—how the "rebels" would boast
over such an easy conquest, how they would terrorize,
harass, and persecute the unprotected Unionists if given
undisputed possession of the country, how the Unionists
themselves would become discouraged, crushed, or es-
tranged.
Sweeny declared himself in favor of holding out to the
last moment. Sweeny thundered, "Let us eat the last bit of
mule ffesh and fire the last cartridge before we think of re-
treating."^^
After the volatile one-armed Irishman had departed, Lyon
returned to his room and lay down on his cot. Surgeon Gomyn
now called upon the general. He "was equally impressed
vdth the impossibility of successfully retreating 120 miles
before such great odds, so lai-gely supplied with cavalry."
Gomyn observed.
The retreat would become a panic, the loss of artillery
and transportation would be the smallest portion of the
disaster; that the loss in men would not be near so much
in a battle; and that the encouragement given to the
rebellion would be in proportion to our own demoraliza-
tion."
Lyon now changed his mind. He would boldly seize the
initiative. About this time, Golonel Franz Sigel's chief quar-
termaster. Major Alexis Mudd, arrived at headquarters. Not
knovrâig of the change in plans, Mudd asked Lyon, "When
do we start back. General?"
Fixing his keen blue eyes on the quartermaster, Lyon re-
plied, "When we are whipped back. Not until then."
"Yes," he continued, "that is the order. No craven shiinking
from imperative duty now. Let what will come, God is eternal,
and just."-"
Orders were then issued alerting the officers to hold their
ti-oops ready to march at 6 p.m. Before taking the field, the
soldiers were to draw all the ammunition that tliey could
carry from the ordnance department. The troops were to
move in light marching order, all unnecessary baggage would
be left behind.2i
18 Ibid: Holcombe and Adams, Battle of Wilson's Creek, 21.
19 Peckham, Lyon and Missouri, 327.
20 Ibid., 328; Holcombe and Adams, Battle of Wilson's Creek, 21-22.
21 Peckham, Lyon and Missouri, 328.
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At a staff meeting held by General Lyon on the aftemoon
of the 8th, Golonel Sigel had proposed that his brigade move
independently of the main column and strike the foe on the
flank and rear. This proposition was unanimously condemned
by the officers present; Lyon also turned it down. When Lyon
announced that he woiüd attack the Gonfederates at day-
break on the 10th, Sigel procured an interview with the
general. This time, he succeeded in persuading Lyon "to
allow him a separate command." Sigel was directed to move
his command down the Yokermill road. He would then turn
toward the southwest and try to gain the Gonfederates' flank
and rear. At Sigel's request, Lyon stated that he would pro-
cure guides and cavalry to assist him. The general would also
let Sigel know the exact time that his column would march.
Next, Sigel asked Lyon whether, on his command's arrival
near the Southemers' position, lie "should attack immediately
or wait untü . . . [he was] apprised of the fight by the other
troops." After reflecting a moment, Lyon replied, "Wait
until you hear the firing on our side." The interview termi-
nated, and Sigel returned to his quarters.^^
While Sigel's command marched against the Gonfederates'
rear and right, Lyon's column would move out the Little York
road to a point nearly opposite the foe's advance pickets on
Wilson Greek. Turning off the road, Lyon's troops would
wheel shai-ply to to tlie left, march across Grand Prairie, and
attack the Southemers' left flank. If the plan worked, the
Rebels would be caught in the jaws of a giant piacers.^^
Shortly before sundown, the bugles were blown and the
drums beaten. The various units constituting the Army of the
West fell in on theü- colors. Since the 1st Iowa was sleeping
under the stars, they had no tents on which to fonn
the regimental line. After the Iowans had been standing in
Line for a few minutes. General Lyon was seen approaching
on his large ü-on-gray horse. He was accompanied by Major
Schofield. Lyon, as he rode by, made a brief speech to each
company. Private Eugene F. Ware, a member of the 1st Iowa,
recalled, "We could not hear what he [the general] said to the
ii!d.; O. R., Series I, Vol. Ill, 96; Franz Sigel, "The Flanking
Column at Wilson's Creek," Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, I, 304.
23 O. R., Series I, Vol. Ill, 60.
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companies on each side of us, owing to the distance apart of
the companies and the low tone of his voice." Reining in his
horse in front of Gompany E, J-,yon announced:
Men, we are going to have a fight. We will march out
in a short time. Don't shoot until you get orders. Fire
low-don't aim higher than their knees; wait until they
get close; don't get scared; it's no part of a soldier's
duty to get scared.2*
On comparing notes after Lyon had departed from the
Iowans' encampment, the soldiers discovered that the gist of
the general's remarks to each of the companies was the
General Sweeny had also spoken to several of the units.
Unlike Lyon, Sweeny had couched his address in terms calcu-
lated to increase the men's enthusiasm. He told the cavalry,
"Stay together boys, and we'll saber hell out of them."-*'
Shortly after Lyon's visit, the ordnance wagons were driven
up and the ammunition distributed. The men of the 1st Iowa
fiUed not only their cartridge-boxes but also the pockets in
their breeches. Since the woolen shirts worn by the Iowans
had pockets, most of the soldiers likewise stuffed these pockets
with ammunition. A wagon from the commissary department
soon appeared on the scene. The soldiers were then issued
two days' rations of beef and pork, which they cooked im-
mediately.^ '^
Before the soldiers had finished preparing the cooked ra-
tions, a sergeant drove up in a large covered army wagon.
The sergeant asked how many were "present for duty." On
being answered by Sergeant Joseph Utter, he threw on the
ground an equal number of "large turtle-sheUed loaves" of
bread. The loaves bounced in the dust, and each of the
Iowans picked up one. Private Ware recalled that his :
24 Eugene F. Ware, The Lyon Campaign in Missouri—Being a History
of the 1st Iowa Infantry (Topeka, 1907), 310; Henry O'Connor, History
of the First Regiment of Ioioa Volunteers (Muscatine, 1862), 11.
25 Ware, The Lyon Campaign in Missouri, 310; O'Connor, History of
the 1st Iowa, 11. O'Connor, a private in Company A, reported tliat
Lyon told his unit, "Boys we may have warm work to-morrow. You are
from a northern state, loyal to the union. The honor of Iowa and the
interests of your country are in your hands; I want you to maintain
them."
28 Ware, The Lyon Campaign in Missouri, 310-311.
27 Ibid., 312.
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, , , actions regarding my loaf was perhaps descriptive
of what the others did, I plugged it like a watermelon
and ate my supper out of the inside. When I had fin-
ished eating I fried up a lot of beef and pork (my 2
days' rations) and crammed it into the loaf and poured
in aU the fat and gravy.
Next, he removed the sling from his rified-musket and se-
cured it to the loaf, and slung it over his shoulder,^^
« « o
About 6 p,m,, the adjutants shouted for the men to fall in.
At a word from Lyon, the troops constituting the general's
striking force moved out of their encampments located on
either side of Wilson Creek at Phelps Crove. Major Sturgis'
brigade took the lead as the column turned into the Little
York road. Captain Charles C, Cilbert's Company B, 1st
U, S, Infantry had the advance as the little army tramped
westward. About 20 residents of the area, including Pleasant
Hart and Parker Cox, were serving as guides and rode with
Cilbert's vanguard,^*
It was twiHght by the time the troops reached the Crand
Prairie west of Springfield, Here, the road was fianked by
large com fields. The day had been hot, and with the setting
of the sun it grew cooler. Private Ware recalled that "life
became more endurable and the marching was anything but
a funeral procession. The boys gave each other elaborate in-
stinictions as to the materials out of which they wanted their
coffins made, and how they wanted them decorated,"^*'
Since Lyon hoped to take the Confederates by sur-
prise, he had given instructions for his officers to try to curb
all unnecessary noise. Therefore, the cannoneers, before
28 Ibid., 313,
29 O. R, Series I, Vol. I l l , 65, 81; Holcombe and Adams, Battle of
Wilson's Creek, 29, Lyon's column consisted of Stinrgis', Andrews, and
Deitzler's brigades. Sturgis' brigade induded: Plummer's battalion; Os-
terhaus' battaUon; Battery F , 2d U. S. Light ArtiUery; Company D, 1st
U. S. Cavalry; and Company I, 2d Kansas Infantry (Mounted), An-
drews' brigade consisted of: Steele's battalion; the 1st Missouri In-
fantry; and Du Bois' four-gun Provisional U, S, Battery. Deitzlers bri-
gade was made up of tlie 1st and 2d Kansas Infantry Regiments, In
addition, the 1st Iowa Infantry and two Home Cuard units were at-
tached to Lyon's striking force,
30 Ware, The Lyon Campaign in Missouri, 314, On the Grand Prairie,
there was no water and very little wood. It was possible to leave the
road and move across the prairie at almost any poin t
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leaving Springfield, had wrapped the wheels of their guns,
limbers, and caissons with blankets. Both the cavahy and the
artillery horses had their hoofs covered with burlap which
was banded at the fetlock. Despite the general's instructions,
the Iowa and the Kansas volunteers were disposed to exer-'
eise their vocal talents. Camp songs of all sorts were sung
con spiritu, as the troops marched along. The 1st Iowa had a
favorite song, the refrain of which ran:
So let the wide world wag as it will.
We'll be gay and happy still.
Gay and happy, gay and happy,
M'e'll be gay and happj' still.
The strains of this song carried out over Grand Prairie loud
enough, it was feared, to have been heard by the Gonfederate
outposts. Encouraged by the efforts of the Iowans, the Kan-
sans sang, "Happy Land of Ganaan," and raised the neighbor-
hood with theü- efforts. Toward midnight, however, the col-
xmm quieted do%vn. Lyon was hear-d to remark'that tlie
Iowans "had too much levity in their composition to do good
fighting." He added "that he would give them an opportunity
to show what they were made oi.'"^^
After reaching a point about five miles west of the Spring-
field square, the head of Lyon's column left the Little York
road and tiimed south. (The place where Lyon left the Little
York road was a littie east of the present-day town of Brook-
hne.) With the guides leading the way, the Federals march-
ed southward across Grand Prairie. At times, the ti-oops fol-
lowed unimproved byroads. The pace of the march was ac-
cordingly slowed down considerably. To make matters worse
the soldiers now left the level open prairie and moved down'
mto the breaks which ffanked Wilson Greek on tlie west^^
Private Ware recalled:
We moved short distances from 20 to 100 yards at
a time, and kept halting and closing up, and making very
s ow progress. FinaUy, we were practically invoh'ed in
iw-^ n ""T'^ T '™°"° ^'^ "'^^-^""^ °^ ^ water-course
[Wilson Creek]. There were some little light clouds
but It was light enough to see a short distance around'
us, by starlight; it was in the dark of the moon. Finally,
" Ibid., Holcombe and Adams, Battle of Wilson's Creek, 28-29.
I, Vol°urà"7f ^^''^' ^""'" 'f ^''''"' ^'''^' 29; O.R., Series
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word was passed along the line that we were inside the
enemy's picket, but were two or three miles from their
camp. Rumors magnified the number of the foe to 25,000.
We could see the sheen in the sky of vast camp fires
beyond the hills, but could not see the light. We also
heard at times the chomses of braying mules.33
Once the Union vanguard had approached to within sight
of the Gonfederate "guard fires," Lyon called a halt. Lyon
would wait until daybreak before resuming the advance. Ac-
cordingly, the word was passed for the men to lie down and
take it easy. The main body of the Union column had halted
on the Milton Norman farm three and one-half miles north-
east of the unsuspecting Gonfederate encampment. It was
about 1 a.m.^ *.
Many of the froops welcomed the stop. Private Ware virote
of his experiences:
About this time, while we were moving along we
passed around the brow of a low, rocky hül, and the line
stopped at a place where our company stood on a broad
ledge of rock. We all laid down on this rock to get rested.
The cool, dewy night air made me feel chilly in the
"linings" which I was wearing; but the radiating heat
which the rock during the day had absorbed, was pe-
culiarly comfortable.^^
General Lyon bivouacked in a com field near the head of
the column. He shared a mbber poncho with Major Schofield.
As the two officers ti-ied to get some rest, Lyon seemed to be
"oppressed with the responsibility of his situation, vñth anxi-
ety for the cause, and with sympathy for the Union people"
in southwestern Missouri in case he should be forced to re-
treat. The general repeatedly expressed himself as having
been abandoned by his superiors .^ ^
While the men were resting, Lyon's scouts reconnoitered
the groimd over which the column would be called upon to
attack.^'' They were able to penetrate to within a short dis-
33 Ware, The Lyon Campaign in Missouri, 315.
3* O. ñ.. Series I, Vol. Ill, 60, 65, 73, 75; Dixie O'Connor, Personal
Interview, Jime 30, 1960.
35 Ware, The Lyon Campaign in Missouri, 315.
38 Wherry, "Wilson's Creek and the Death of Lyon," 292-293.
37 Holcombe and Adams, Battle of Wilson's Creek, 29; W. S. Burke,
Mibiary History of Kansas Regiments ( Leavenworth, 1870), 3.
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tance of the Gonfederate camps without encountering any
pickets. Having obtained the desired information, the scouts
made their way back to Lyon's command post.
o o o
It was between 4 and 5 p.m. on the 9th when Sigel received
instructions from General Lyon to move at 6:30 o'clock. At
this time, Sigel's brigade was stationed at Gamp Fremont on
the south side of Springfield near the YokermiU road. Sigel
accordingly alerted his subordinates to hold theii- men ready
to take the field.»«
At 6:30 sharp, Sigel's brigade marched out of the encamp-
ment. After the column had traveled about five miles, it
turned off the Yokermill road. Moving in, a southwesterly di-
rection along the old Delaware road, Sigel's troops left the
prairie country and entered a wooded area. It was very dark;
about 9 p.m. it started to drizzle. After a short while the rain
ceased, but the sky remained overcast. It was with consider-
able difficulty that the Federals found their way and kept
from getting separated. About 11 p.m., Sigel halted his
column. So far, Gaptain Eugene A. Garr's cavalrymen, who
screened Sigel's advance, had been able successfully to dis-
charge their assignment. No news of the Union movement had
reached the foe's encampment, as Garr's troopers had ar-
rested every person encountered, and placed guards on all the
houses in the neighborhood. The troops were permitted to
rest tmtil 2 a.m., when the march was renewed.^^
As the first streak of dawn appeared on the eastern horizon,
Sigel's command resumed the march. After advancing about
one and one-half miles, Garr's troopers succeeded in cutting
off and captm-ing about 40 Gonfederate foragers. (At the
time that they were made prisoners, the Southemers were
busy digging potatoes, picking roasting ears, gathering toma-
toes, and procuring other supplies for their individual com-
missary departments.) This operation was carried out in
such a fashion tiiat none of the Rebels was able to escape and
sound the alarm. On being questioned, one of the prisoners
38 Sigel, "The Flanking Column at Wilson's Creek," 304; O. H., Series
I, Vol. Ill, 86, 89-90; Holcombe and Adams, Battle of Wilson's Creek,
29-30.
39 Sigel, "The Flanking Column at Wikon's Creek," 304; O. R. Series
I, Vol. Ill, 89.
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stated "that their army was expecting re-enforcements from
Louisiana, and that they had mistaken us for their re-enforce-
ments.""
Shortly thereafter, Sigel, who was riding with Garr, came
out on a commanding knoll. From this position, the colonel
obtained an excellent view of the tents occupied by the Gon,-
federate cavaky which were located on the west side of Wil-
son Greek. Sigel made his dispositions, preparatory to attack-
ing."
When the Union army marched to attack the Gonfederates,
General Lyon had left the Ghristian and Greene Gounty
Home Guards (about 1,200 strong) to hold Springfield. Be-
sides garrisoning the city, the Home Guards were directed to
watch the Telegraph road. In case the Federals should fail
to defeat the Rebels, Springfield would have to be evacuated.
Golonel Boyd of the Home Guard tlierefore made certain
that everything was ready to facilitate an orderly retreat. Wa-
gons were loaded, and the bank deposits were secured for
transfer. These were closely guarded by the Home Guard."
About 4 a.m., Lyon had his ofiBcers arouse their men. One
of the soldiers recalled, "just as there was a slight flush of
dawn in the east, somebody came along and woke us all up,
and told us to keep still and fall in line." Gaptain Gilbert's
company again had the lead as the Union column moved
off."
Upon resuming the march, the Federals advanced in a
southwesterly direction, with a view to striking the most
northerly portion of the Gonfederate encampment. Except for
Gilbert's soldiers who were deployed as skirmishers, Lyon's
units marched in column by companies. At daylight, the Fed-
erals caught their first glimpse of the Gonfederate pickets.
The Rebel outposts fled at the Yankees' approach. Lyon, to
•io Sigel, "The Flanking Column at Wilson's Creek," 304; O. H.,
Series I, Vol. Ill, 89, 91; Holcombe and Adams, Battle of Wibons
Creek, 30.
*i Sigel "The Flanking Column at Wilson's Creek," 304; O. R.,
Series I, Vol. Ill, 86, 89, 91; Holcombe and Adams, Battle of Wilsons
Creek, 30.
*2 Holcombe and Adams, Battle of Wilson's Creek, 30.
43 O. R., Series I, Vol. Ill, 60, 65.
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be on the safe side, quickly deployed Major Joseph B_Pluni-
mer's battalion of regulars into line of battle. Major Pe er J,
Osterhaus' battalion of Missourians was sent to the right as
skirmishers, while Colonel Andrews' 1st Missomi was called
up and massed in support of Captain James Tottens battery.
When these dispositions were completed, the advance was
renewed,**
Lyon's troops forged ahead rapidly. About one and one-half
miles were covered before the Yankee vanguard sighted any
more Southerners, During this portion of the advance, the
Northerners passed through a small wheat field crossed a
hiU and entered the vaUey where E, Ben Shorts farm was
located Just as the Shorts were sitting down to breakfast
they glanced out the kitchen window and saw that tlieir yard
was full of soldiers. The men were moving on the double and
the horses at the tirot,"
As the Federal skirmishers prepared to ascend the ridge
south of the Short house, they were fired upon by the Con-
federates Without hesitating a moment. Captain Totten shout-
ed for Ueutenant Ceorge O, Sokalski to put lus section into
battery Quickly unlimbering their guns, the artillerists opened
fire on the Rebels on the wooded ridge to their front. Tottens
other four pieces were "thrown forward into batteiy on the
right on higher ground." Once the artillery had softened up
the Rebels with a few rounds, the infantiy quickly dislodged
them and secured the crest of tlie hill. Before pressing on,
Lyon halted his command to perfect his dispositions. Calling
for Major Plummer, Lyon told him to take his battalion and
cross to the east side of Wilson Creek, Plummer's mission was
to keep the Southerners from turning Lyon's left fiank. Once
he was in position, Plummer was to regulate the pace of
his advance by that of the main column,*"
The Union advance had taken the Confederates by suprise.
On the previous evening, Ceneral McCulloch had issued or-
ders for his army to be ready to take the field. He planned to
itlbid 60, 65, 72. The 1st Missouri marched parallel to Battery
F "and about 60 yards distant." Shortly thereafter. Colonel Andrews
deployed as skirmishers and threw forward one company (hi;.
*5 Ibid., 60, 73; L, E, Meador, Personal Interview, June 27, 1960,
46 O. R., Series I, Vol, III, 60, 65, 73,
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attack Springfield at dawn. About 9 p.m., it started to rain
and McCulloch suspended his projected forward movement.
During the night, the Southerners had recalled their out-
posts. Accordingly, the Northerners were able to penetrate
very close to the Rebels' encampment without being discov-
ered. At dawn. Colonel John Cawthorn (the officer in com-
mand of the mounted Gonfederate brigade assigned to Briga-
dier General James S. Rains' division of the Missouri State
Guard) became apprehensive and sent a patrol up the west
side of Wilson Greek.*^ This patrol had not advanced more
than one and one-half miles beyond Gibson's Mill before the
soldiers discovered that there were Yankees operating in the
area. News of this important development was immediately
relayed to Golonel Gawthorn. The brigade commander called
for Colonel De Witt G. Hunter, who commanded one of liis
regiments. Hunter was told to take his unit ( about 300 effec-
tives) and ascertain whether the foe was advancing in force
or not.
It was about 5 a.m. when Hunter's troops reached the crest
of the ridge overlooking the Short farm, and sighted the head
of Lyon's column. Hunter's first intention was to attack. The
aggressive colonel felt tliat a sudden attack might throw the
Union advance into confusion. By tliis time, Lyon had also
spotted Gonfederates. While Totten's gunners unlinibered
their guns, the initial Union assault wave ( Osterhaus' battalion
on the right, the 1st Missouri in the center, and Plummer's
battalion on the left) rolled up the hiU. Confronted by this
formidable force. Hunter's Confederates fell back upon their
encampment.**
In the meantime. Colonel Gawthorn had heard tlie sound
of the firing as the Yankees established contact wtih Hunter's
regiment. Gawthorn accordingly proceeded to dismount and
form the remainder of his brigade into line of battle on the
north face of "Bloody Hill." All told, Gawthorn (after de-
*^  The Missouri commands were territorial, each brigadier general
having command of the troops raised within his military district. Parsons,
Clark, and McBride had, respectively, only 531, 552, and 649 officers
and men on the field, and Slack only 940. Nevertheless, their commands
were called divisions. The regiments of the Missouri State Guard con-
sisted of eight companies of 50 men each, present and absent.
*^Ibid., 127; Thomas L. Snead, The Fight for Missouri-From the
Election of Lincoln to the Death of Lyon (New York, 1888), 269.
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tailing the men necessary to hold the horses) was able to
deploy about 600 men. When Hunter's men, falling back in
the face of Lyon's push, reached Gawthom's main line of re-
sistance, the brigade commander halted Hxmter. Gawthorn
told Hunter to retire faither down the creek and dismount his
men. When this business had been taken care of, Hmiter
would return to the front and deploy his regiment on the
brigade's right flank.*®
Upon gaining the crest of the ridge overlooking Gavi^om's
camp, Lyon sighted a Gonfederate brigade (Gawthom's)
massed into line of battle on the opposite slope. Lyon now
called up the 1st Kansas. The Kansans were ordered to take
position on the left of the 1st Missouri. This order to move to
the front reached Golonel George W. Deitzler about 5 a.m.
Before leading his Kansans into position, Deitzler rode along
his regiment's line, and as one of the soldiers recalled:
. . . electrified tlie spirits and hopes of his men, by
uttering a few sharp, emphatic sentences, that did more to
arouse their feeling than the most elaborate speech, de-
livered by the most gifted and eloquent orator, could have
done. Rising in his stirrups, he exclaimed in language
more emphatic than reverent, "Boys, we've got them, d—m
them."50
After the colonel had finished his speech, he led his men up
the hill on the double. As they scaled the hill, the Kansans
sang:
So let the wide world wag as it will.
We'll be gay and happy.^i
After Hunter's mounted regiment had fallen back, Gaptain
Totten shouted for his men to limber up their six field pieces.
Once the artillerists had hitched up their guns, Totten led
them up the ridge, hard on the heels of the infantrymen of
the 1st Kansas and the 1st Missouri. Before Totten could get
his gims into battery, the Kansans and Missourians had moved
against Gawthom's main line of resistance. A brief skirmish
*8 Snead, The Fight for Missouri, 269. Cavrthom deployed his bri-
gade on the slope south of the ravine, where his brigade had pitched
its tents. Subsequent to the battle, the term "Bloody Hill" was given to
the area where Price's and Lyon's commands met in bloody conflict.
50 Burke, Military History of Kansas Regiments, 3; O. fi.. Series I,
Vol. Ill , 60, 66, 82.
51 Burke, Military History of Kansas Regiments, 12.
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was necessary to drive the Rebels from their position. Fall-
ing back across the brow of "Bloody Hill," Gawthorn's troops
took cover on its southern slope. Here, for the time being at
least, they were safe.'^ ^
The remainder of Lyon's command followed the assault
wave up the ridge south of the Short farm. Grossing the head
of the ravine where the now deserted tents of Gav\i:hom's
brigade were located, the troops ascended the northem slope
of "Bloody Hill." The 1st Kansas and the 1st Missouri had
already crossed the crest of the hill, as they pressed relent-
lessly after Gawthom's defeated brigade. The Union advance,
however, was suddenly slowed when a Rebel battery (the Pu-
laski Arkansas) ojiened fire. From a masked position on the
eastern side of Wilson Greek, the Arkansas cannoneers began
to rake the attacking Yankees with shot and shell. This fire
slowed the pace of the Federals' drive. Gaution now became
the watchword. To neutralize the effect of this shelling, Lyon
directed Gaptain Totten to put his guns into battery. Totten
accordingly placed his pieces in position on a knoll, which
was a short distance west of Gawthorn's abandoned encamp-
ment. The ground occupied by the Pulaski Arkansas Battery
was within easy range of Totten's guns. Gaptain Totten re-
ported:
The left half battery was then brought into position,
but the right half battery, in reality occupying the most
favorable ground, was principally directed against the
enemy's battery, although the whole six pieces, as oppor-
tunity occurred, played upon the enemy's guns.
Since the position where Gaptain William E. Woodruff's Ar-
kansans had emplaced their four guns was masked from their
view, the gun captains of Battery F had to use as their aiming
points the flash and smoke of the opposing
Wilson Greek has changed very litue since the Givü War.
Now, as then, Wilson Greek rises in and around Springfield.
The stream flows in a westerly direction for about five mues
before veering sharply to the south. About nine miles beyond
this point, the creek debouches into the James River, a tribu-
na Snead, The Fight for Missouri, 269-270; O. R., Series I, Vol. Ill,
60, 73, 75-76.
63 O. ñ.. Series I, Vol. Ill, 78.
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tary of the White. About one mile above its - - 0 ; ^ « - « J ^ *
th/ïames Wilson Greek receives the waters of TeneU Creek,
wM h e o m l i : from the west One and one^half niiles above
le mouth of Terrell Greek, Skegg's Branch discharges into
Wilson Greek. Like TerreU Greek, Skegg's Branch flows from
west to east At the time of the war, the Telegraph road
tossed both Terrell Greek and Skegg's Branch near theu:
mouths. About one-half mile north of SkeggJ .f^"\ ,
telegraph road crossed Wilson Greek. Springfield lay about
twelve mues northeast of this ford. ,, ^ i
Bounded by WÜson Greek on the east, Terrell Greek on
the south, and in part by the Telegraph road on the west
were several large com fields. In these fields were encamped
most of the mounted units belonging to McGuUochs ^my.
Brigadier General Alexander E. Steen was in chai-ge of the
cavaky encampment.^* , rr. i v.
Between Skegg's Branch and the ford where the Telegraph
road crossed WÜson Greek, the valley was quite narrow. At
this point, the road paralleled the west bank of the stieam.
West of the road rose a commanding eminence kno\\Ti since
the battle as "Bloody Hill." The crest of the hiU was almost 170
feet higher than the creek at this point; its sides were deeply
scarred with ravines, and dented here and there with sink-
holes In 1861, as it is today, the hill was covered with a
dense growth of underbrush and scrub oak. At numerous
places on the hill, especially near its crest, there were out-
croppings of rocks. . , , „ j „r-i
In the narrow valley between the foot of the hill and Wilson
Greek were bivouacked aU the infantry of the Missouri State
Guard except Golonel Richard H. Weightman's brigade.
(Weightman's brigade was camped at Manley's Spring, about
two-thirds of a mile east of the point where Skegg's Branch
flows into WÜson Greek.) Price's headquarters were next to
the road, about 200 yards south of the ford.»»
East of WÜson Greek (opposite the area where Price's m-
fantrj^  had encamped) was a plateau. This ground was about
30 feet above the stream. The infantry and artilleiy assigned
to Brigadier Generals Ben McGulloch's and N. Bart Pearces
54 Snead, The Fight for Missouri, 259.
85 Ibid., 259-260; O. R., Series I, Vol. LUI, 435.
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commands were encamped on this terrain. Captain Wood-
ruff's Pulaski Battery was posted on a partially detached por-
tion of the plateau near the Cuinn house. Captain J, C, Reid's
Fort Smith Arkansas Batteiy camped at the southern edge of
the plateau, opposite the mouth of Skegg's Branch,^ «
Colonel Cawthorn's mounted brigade of Rains' division
camped in the ravine, which debouched into Wilson Creek
from the west about one-half mile north of the ford. This
ravine bounded "Bloody Hill" on the north. Rains' quaiters,
however, were on the opposite side of the creek at Cibson's
Mill. A few of Rains' troopers also bivouacked on the left
bank of Wilson Creek,"
» o «
Ceneral Rains, to whose division Cawthorn's brigade was
attached, had established his headquarters on the east side of
Wilson Creek near Cibson's Mill, About the time that Hunt-
er's regiment moved to the front. Rains received reports from
his foraging parties indicating tliat the Yankees were "advanc-
ing in force" on the west side of Wilson Creek and had pene-
trated to within three mues of his camp. Rains called for
Colonel Snyder, his chief of staff, Snyder was directed to go
and "see what was the matter," On reaching the prairie west
of the creek, Snyder saw the Federals approaching. Hastening
back to Rains, Snyder told the general that the Yankees were
advancing in great force, "tlieir soldiers and cannon covering
the whole praüie," Rains ordered Snydei- to carry this news
to Ceneral
It was after 5 a.m., and neither Price nor McCulloch (who
was at the Missourian's headquarters) suspected that the
Northerners had marched out of Springfield. Suddenly, Col-
onel Snyder galloped up on a sweat-flecked horse. The colonel,
almost breathless from excitement, announced that "Lyon was
approacliing with 20,000 men and 100 pieces of artillery," The
5ß Snead, The Fight for Missouri, 260; Map titled, "Field of Battle
of Oak Hill, August 10, 1861," W. E. Woodruff, With the Light Guns in
'61-'6S (Little Rock, 1903); N. Bart Pearce, "Arkansas Troops in the
Battle of Wilson's Creek," Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, I, 298,
" Snead, The Fight for Missouri, 260,
58 Ibid., 271,
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Staff officer reported that, at the moment, the Yankees were
"within less than a mile of Rains' camp.""®
"O, pshaw," said McGulloch, laughingly, "that's another of
Rains' scares," alluding to the Dug Springs affair. (At Dug
Springs on August 2, Rains' cavahy had fied in confusion
when fired on by the Union artillery.) "Tell General Rains I
will come to the front myself directly," he added.* "^
The three officers (McGulloch, Mclntosh, and Price) re-
sumed eating. Inside of two or three minutes, another officer
rode up. The newcomer reported that "Rains was falling back
before overwhelming numbers, and needed instant and heavy
reinforcements."" ^
McGulloch again expressed disbelief, remarking, "O, non-
sense! That's not true.""^
Glancing up from the table, however, the officers were able
to "see a great crowd of men on horseback, some armed ,and
others unarmed, mixed in with wagons and teams and led
horses, all in dreadful confusion, scampering over the liiU and
rushing toward us—a panic-stricken mob." Moments later, the
Gonfederate officers "saw the ffash and heard the report" of
Totten's guns. Then, in quick response, the sound of Sigel's
guns came drifting in from the south. (Sigel's artillerists had
just opened fire on the encampments occupied by the Gon-
federate cavalry. ) ^ ^
Within seconds, McGuUoch, followed by Mclntosh, was in
the saddle and on his way to take charge of the troops sta-
tioned on the east bank of Wilson Creek. At the same time.
Price ordered the "long roll" beaten. After leaving instructions
for the members of his staff to hurry forwai'd his infantry and
artillery. Price galloped up "Bloody Hill." "Old Pap" plarmed
to rally Cavi^ thorn's shattered brigade which was falling back
in confusion before Lyon's advance. The general hoped that
he could rally enough of Cawthorn's troopers to delay the Fed-
58 Ibid., 271-272; O. R., Series I, Vol. I l l , 127.
60 Holcombe and Adams, Battle of Wilson's Creek, 53.
61 Snead, The Fight for Missouri, 272. Colonel James Mclntosh served
as McGulloch's chief of staflF.
62 Holcombe and Adams, Battle of Wilson's Creek, 53.
83 Ibid.; Snead, The Fight for Missouri, 272.
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eral advance, pending the deployment of the remainder of
his Missourians.®*
The enfilade fire delivered by Gaptain Woodruff's Pulasld
Battery had slowed the pace of the Union advance. Therefore,
Price was able to regroup a portion of Gavsiiiorn's brigade.
"Old Pap" re-formed the dismounted cavalrymen several hun-
dred yards south of the crest of "Bloody Hill." Here, the
shaken troopers were screened by tlie dense undergrowth.
Better still, they were in defilade and no longer exposed to
the fire of Totten's battery.«''^
The infantry contingents belonging to Brigadier Generals
John B. Glark's, James H. McBride's, Mosby M. Parsons', and
William Y. Slack's divisions of the Missouri State Guard which
were camped on the west side of Wilson Greek formed on the
double. As soon as they had mustered their units, the officers
led their cheering soldiers up the soutlieastern face of "Bloody
Hill." Within a few minutes after the alarm had been sounded,
the Missourians were in contact with Lyon's battle line. From
right to left. Price's troops were deployed: the remnants of
Gawthom's brigade. Slack's, Glark's, Parsons', and McBride's
divisions.
Weightman's infantry brigade of Rains' division had camp-
ed on the east side of Wilson Greek at Manley's Spring. While
the soldiers were busy preparing breakfast, the sound of firing
came drifting in from the northwest (Totten's gims firing on
Himter's combat patrol). Shortly thereafter, the troops were
startled when the roar of cannon came rolling up from the
southwest. ( Sigel had laimched his attack on the encampment
of the Gonfederate cavalry.) Without a moment's hesitation,
Weightman tumed his command out under arms.
The colonel eagerly awaited his marching orders, which
were not long in arriving. An aide came galloping up and di-
rected Weightman to move to Price's assistance. At a word
from Weightman, the brigade moved off in a northeasterly di-
rection. Reaching the plateau near the Guinn house, Weight-
man called for Major Ezra H. Brashear of the 2d Regiment.
Brashear was directed to take his command and post it in
6* Snead, The Fight for Missouri, 272-273; O. H., Series I, Vol. Ill,
100, 104-105.
«5 Snead, The Fight for Missouri, 273.
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support of the Pulaski Battery. In the next breath, Weightman
told Golonel Thomas H. Rosser to take his command (the 1st
Regiment and the 4th Battalion) and Gaptain Hiram M. Bled-
soe's battery and hasten to the cavalry's assistance. After ford-
ing Wilson Greek, Rosser led his men down the Telegraph
road toward the Sharp house.
Accompanied by the 3d and 5th regiments (about 700
strong), Weightman crossed Wilson Greek at the ford. Push-
ing up the southeastem face of "Bloody HiU," Weightman
used his two regiments to plug the gap that had opened be-
tween Slack's division and Gawthorn's brigade. Weightman's
hardy soldiers reached the field about one-half hour after
McBride's troops had moved into position on Parson's left.*^
The main line of resistance which Price succeeded in or-
ganizing to dispute Lyon's advance, following the arrival of
Weightman's two regiments, was held by over 3,100 men and
four cannons. Furthermore, Price's Missourians received con-
siderable assistance from the four guns of the Pulaski Ar-
kansas Batteiy emplaced on the east side of the creek. From
their position at the Guinn house, tiie Arkansas cannoneers
were able to enfilade the Union line of advance.^''
« a »
In the meantime, Lyon's initial assault wave (the 1st Kan-
sas and the 1st Missouri) had driven across the crest of
"Bloody Hill." The Federals now endeavored to force their
way down the south slope. General Price, by this time, had
succeeded in forming his main line of resistance. The Federals
had lost the advantage that the element of surprise had pre-
viously given them.
At this time, the 'Tjang" of a cannon was heard drifting up
from the south. It came from the direction where Sigel was
supposed to be operating. Stin-gis mistakenly thought he heard
an answering report. "^^
Lyon's battle line now pressed forward. The firing, which
86 O. ñ.. Series I, Vol. Ill, 128; Snead, The Fight for Missouri, 274-
275.
«T Snead, The Fight for Missouri, 274.
68 O.ñ., Series I, Vol. Ill, 66. The first firing that Sturgis heard was
when Sigel's guns opened fire on the Confederate encampment. Sigel
put his guns into action two otlier times. Apparently, only the first of
these two bombardments was audible to Sturgis.
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had been spirited for the past one-half hour, now increased
to a continuous roar, heard in Springfield. For the better part
of the next 30 mniutes, the battle waxed hot and heavy.*'^
At first, the battle lines were not more than 300 yards apart.
Except in a few isolated instances, the combatants were con-
cealed from one another by the intervening foliage. Since
Price's Missourians were armed almost exclusively with
shotguns and common rifles, it was mandatory for the general
(since the opposing forces were so near to each other) either
to close with Lyon's battle line, or wait for the Federals to
assaü his position. Price chose the latter alternative—he
would let the Yankees attack.
Price did not have to wait long. In a few minutes, the com-
mand "Forward!" was distinctly heard. It was followed by the
tramp of men, and the crackling of brush. When Lyon's sol-
diers closed to within easy range of Price's Missourians, "there
rang upon the air the sharp crack of 1,000 rifles and the re-
port of a 1,000 shotguns." Missourian and Kansan now fought
to the death against Missourian on the leafy hillside while,
from the opposing heights, Totten (who had been stationed
at Little Rock, where his family resided) fought furiously
against the Pulasld Ai-kansas Battery.'^ "
When Guibor's battery (which was emplaced on the south-
em slope of "Bloody Hill") started to rake his advance,
Golonel Andrews shouted for the men of the 1st Missouri to
get ready to charge the guns. Before the colonel could com-
plete his dispositions, he observed that a strong force of
Rebels (McBride's division) were about to turn his right
flank. Andrews accordingly decided to abandon his attempt
to capture the ai-tillery. Simultaneously, the colonel sent a
messenger to point out the location of the Rebel battery to
Gaptain Totten. To cope with this threat to his right flank,
Andrews posted part of his regiment at right angles to his line
of battle. Opening fire, these men succeeded in throvidng back
McBride's soldiers.
All this time, the left wing of Andrews' regiment had been
trading volleys with Parsons' and Glark's troops. Satisfied that
the right vsdng would be able to hold its own, Golonel Aa-
69 Ibid.; Holcombe and Adams, Battle of Wilson's Creek, 33-34.
•"• Snead, The Fight for Missouri, 275.
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drews rode toward the left. As he passed each company, the
colonel "found it well up to its work, both officers and men
cool and determined, using their guns with care and preci-
The 1st Kansas held the ground on the left and slightly in
advance of the 1st Missouri, A ravine ( about 60 yards across )
separated the two regiments. In crossing the crest of "Bloody
Hill," the Kansans were exposed to an enfilading fire from the
Pulaski Arkansas Battery, The Confederates, however, were
putting too much elevation on their pieces. Consequently,
the round shot from their guns went howling high over the
trees under which tlie Kansans marched,"^
After Price had throvra. Parsons' and McBride's divisions of
the Missouri State Cuard into the fray. Captain Totten re-
ported that the fighting raged "in. the thick woods and under-
brush to the front and right of the position occupied by , , ,
[hisl battery," When Lyon learned that the 1st Missouri was
being hard-pressed by Clark's, Parsons' and McBride's troops,
he ordered Totten to advance one of his sections to Andrews'
assistance. Taking charge of one of his sections, Totten moved
forward. In addition to the crews serving the guns, Totten
was assisted by Captain Cordon Cranger and Lieutenant
David Murphy, These two guns were placed in battery in
front of Colonel Andrews' right fiank company. Within 200
yards of the position, where the guns had been unlimbered
was a Confederate regiment. This Rebel unit displayed two
fiags—one the National Emblem, the other a secessionist ban-
ner. At first. Captain Totten was uncertain of his proper
course of action. He was afraid "that by some accident a por-
tion of our own troops might have got thus far in advance,"
Totten's qualms were soon dispelled when the opposing battle
71 O. R., Series I, Vol. Ill, 76, The 1st Missouri was massed on a
small elevated plateau. Captain Nelson Cole of Company E had heea
shot in the lower jaw and had to be sent to the rear. Before being
evacuated, the captain, although unable to speak, by the use of gestures
sought to encourage his men. Captain Cary Cratz had observed a force
of Confederates led by a mounted officer carrying a Union flag ap-
proaching his unit. Drawing his revolver, Cratz fired and knocked the
Rebel officer off his horse but, upon striking the ground, the Southerner
immediately arose and rushed Üirough his lines, Gratz fired a second
shot, which pitched the Confederate headlong out of sight. The foe
now opened fire, and the captain fell, pierced by five shots,
72 Ibid., 82-83; Burke, Military History of Kansas Regiments, 3.
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line fired a volley at his gunners. The Yankees replied with
cannister.''^
By this time. Lieutenant John V. Du Bois' provisional bat-
tery had reached the front. Since no position had been as-
signed him. Du Bois had his cannoneers unlimber their four
smoothbore gims (three 6-pounders and one 12-pounder) on
the eastern slope of "Bloody Hill" about 400 yards west of
the Pulaski Arkansas Batteiy. (Du Bois' guns were about 70
yards to the left and rear of Totten's position.) Once his men
had plaeed their pieces in battery. Du Bois had them open fire
on the Arkansans' guns.''*
Captain Frederick Steele's battahon of regulars was posted
in support of Du Bois' battery.''^ The 1st Iowa was drawn
up in hne of battle on the left of Du Bois' gmis. Two com-
panies (D and E) of the 1st Iowa were deployed as skir-
mishers and thrown forward. Tliroughout the artillery duel,
the Iowans grimly held their ground. Private Ware recalled:
Across . . . [Wilson Creek] which was not very far,
perhaps one-third of a mile, a battery [the Pulaski]
made a speciality of our ranks, opening out thunder-
ously. We all lay down on the ground, and for some time
the shells, round shot and canister were playing closely
over our heads.
Our company [E] did not have much to do for a while
in the way of shooting; we simply laid down on tlie
ridge and watched the battery . . . [to our right], or sat
up or kneeled down.
The duel was very interesting and our boys stayed
close to the earth. Considerable damage was done to our
artülery, but they were not silenced. One of tlie large
roan artillery horses was standing back of the gun over
the crest of the hill. A shell from the battery in front of
us struck this horse and tore off its left shoulder. Then be-
gan the most horrible screams and neighing I ever heard.
One of the soldiers shot the horse through the heart.^«
Major Osterhaus' battalion was stationed on the extreme
right of Lyon's battle line. The right fiank of Osterhaus' com-
" O. R., Series I, Vol. Ill, 74.
74 Ibid., 66, 79-80; Holcombe and Adams, Battle of Wilson's Creek,
92; Burke, Military History of Kansas Regiments, 3; "Field of Battle of
Oak Hill, August IO, 1861," With the Light Guns.
•'S O. R. Series I, Vol. HI, 78.
•^ 6 Ware, The Lyon Campaign in Missouri, 317-318.
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mand rested on a ravine which turned abruptly to Lyon's
right and rear. Osterhaus had the task of keeping the Rebels
from turning the right fiank of Lyon's main Une of resist-
ance.^^
The 2d Kansas, the other regiment which had accom-
panied Lyon's column, was held in resen^e. Golonel Robert
B. Mitchell accordingly stationed his men on tlie hill west of
and overlooking Ray's com field.'^*'
Gaptains Theodore A. Svwtzler's and Glark Wright's Home
Guard companies and Gaptain Samuel N. Wood's mounted
company of the 2d Kansas were stationed on the high, open
ground north of "Bloody Hill." It was their mission to watch
Lyon's rear and right fiank.''''
For fully one-half hour, the armies struggled for the pos-
session of "Bloody Hill." Back and forth over tlie ground the
battle ebbed and fiowed. On two or three occasions, the Union
troops retired "in more or less disorder." Each time, however,
the officers succeeded in rallying their soldiers. They then
pressed forward with increased vigor and forced the Seces-
sionists to recoil a few steps. At last, the Federals were left
in possession of the ground, the Gonfederates falling back to
regroup.*"
<» 0 «
After crossing to the east side of Wilson Greek near Gib-
son's MiU, Major Plummer's regular battalion advanced into
Ray's com field. The regulars hoped to capture tlie Pulasld
Battery. Before Plummer's men had reached their objective,
they encountered a Gonfederate force commanded by Golonel
Mclntosh and were repulsed. Falling back, the regulars re-
crossed Wilson, Greek. When Mclntosh's Gonfederates ti-ied
to follow the retreating bluecoats, the fire of Du Bois' battery
and the sharpshooters of the 1st Iowa forced them to fall back
in disorder.
TT O. R., Series I, Vol. Ill, 66.
''^ Ibid., 84. The 2d Kansas was probably stationed on the hill north
of Cawthom's abandoned encampment.
•^ 9 Burke, Militan/ History of Kansas Regiments, 3; Holcombe and
Adams, Battle of Wilson's Creek, 96.
80 O. R. Series I, Vol. HI. 66; O. R. Scries I, Vol. LIII, 423; Hol-
combe and Adams, Battle of Wilson's Creek, 33-34.
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In the meantime, Golonel Sigel's column had routed Steen's
mounted division from its encampments in the large fields
north of TeiTell Greek. As soon as the Rebel horsemen had
scattered Sigel pressed rapidly northward. After sweeping
through Steen's encampments, Sigel's blueclads took up a
strong position astidde the Telegraph road near the Shaip
°From this position, Sigel's battery opened fire on the rear
of Price's ti-oops, who were battling Lyon's ti-oops on "Bloody
mil" So far, Sigel had taken a number of prisoners, and had
blocked the Telegraph road. Many of his men, however, had
faUen out of ranks and were busy plundering the Gonfederate
encampments. „
About this time, there was a lull in the firing on Bloody
HiU" A squad of unarmed Southemers came up tiie Tele-
graph road and were easily captiired by Sigel's command. To
Sigel it looked as if the Gonfederates were about to give
way.'what Sigel did not know was that McGuUoch was or-
gaxázia<y a force with which to counterattack his brigade.
Suddenly, out of the dense smoke tiiat clouded the Wüson
Greek bottom, marched a column of gray-clad ti-oops. Sigel
and his men mistook the approaching force for tlie 1st Iowa,
which wore gray uniforms. Unfortimately for the Federals,
the newcomers belonged to a battalion of the crack 3d Louisi-
ana. "I did not tinst my own eyes," Sigel later wrote, "but
sent Gorporal Tod, of the 3d Missouri, for\vai-d to chaUenge
them. He challenged as ordered, but was immediately shot
and killed. I instantly ordered the artillery and infantry to fire.
But it was too late-the ai-tillery fired one or two shots, but
the infantry, as though paralyzed, did not fire; the 3d Louisi-
ana which we had mistaken for the gray-clad 1st Iowa, msh«i
up to the plateau, while Bledsoe's bati:ery in front and Reid's
from the heights on our right flank opened with canister at
point-blank range against us."^^
Sigel's men panicked and fled, those who escaped fleemg
down the Telegraph road. During the retieat, Sigel lost all his
guns except one, and most of his command.
o « «
In the next issue of the ANNALS Dr. Bearss continues the narrative of
the Battle of Wilson's Creek to its violent conclusion with the deieat anü
retreat of the Union forces to Springfield.
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